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Summary 
Although it may be early to draw very firm conclusions, especially about 
durability, the balance of payments of most Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) have experienced a notable improvement since 1994. 
In 1994, exports grew strongly and current account deficits shrank considerably 
in a majority of countries, reversing the severe deterioration that had occurred 
in 1993. Preliminary data for 1995 are not as favourable. Although the aggregate 
current account deficit of the region remains, in terms of GDP, significantly below 
its 1993 peak, it increased in 1995. It is too early to fally assess this recent 
deterioration, but projections for 1996-97 point towards a renewed decline in 
the deficit to around its 1994 level. 
Capital inflows have increased sharply in many CEEC. The region has been 
receiving since 1993 an average net annual capital inflow which is larger in 
terms of GDP than that observed in most countries of Latin America and Asia 
during their capital inflow surge episodes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Reflecting the strengthening of the current and capital accounts, official foreign 
exchange reserves have been rising rapidly and stand now at their highest level 
since the transition began and, in many countries, at relatively comfortable levels 
in terms of imports. 
Ratings and access to the international capital markets are improving. Three 
countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) have obtained investment 
grade marks from at least one of the major international rating agencies. In the 
case of Poland, Bulgaria and Slovenia, the restoration of market access has been 
facilitated by the 1994 debt agreements with their commercial bank creditors. 
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After increasing rapidly in 1992 and 1993, net foreign 
direct investment ( FDI) into CEEC fell moderately in 1994 
and, with the exception of Estonia, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, continued to represent a relatively small fraction 
of GDP. Supported by several important privatization 
operations, however, FDI is estimated to have recovered 
strongly in /995. 
The region 'sforeign debt/GDP ratio hasfallen by one third 
between end-1990 and mid-1995. However, this is 
explained by the impressive decline in the Polish and 
Bulgarian ratios. The foreign debt/GDP ratio has 
increased in a majority of countries over recent years and 
remains relatively high for the region as a whole. 
The main exception to these positive general trends in the 
balance of payments is Hungary. Although Hungary has 
been, together with the Czech Republic, the major 
beneficiary of the surge in capital inffows to the region and 
has recorded an important increase in its reserves, it 
suffered in 1993-94 a sharp deterioration in its current 
account and a rapid worsening of its debt ratios from 
already high levels. The current accounts of the Baltic 
states and, to a lesser extent, the Czech Republic also 
worsened quite sharply in 1993-94. But this deterioration 
has taken place from comfortable surpluses and has been 
offset (particularly in the case of the Czech Republic) by 
the increase in capital inflows. 
The abrupt increase in capital inflows experienced by 
CEEC as a group since 1993 has been fully explained by 
the expansion o.f private inflows. As a result, the proportion 
of official inflows in total capital inflows has fallen 
considerably between the periods 1990-92 and 1993-95. 
The sustainability of these positive external trends, 
however, will crucially depend on the economic policies 
implemented by CEEC. If the authorities pursue policies 
conducive to macroeconomic stability and systemic 
transformation, private capital should continue flowing 
into CEEC in substantial amounts in the coming years, and 
the trend towards an increasingly dominant role for this 
type of flows in total capital flows should not be reversed. 
The main risks to this favourable scenario stem from the 
slow progress being made by some CEEC in the main areas 
o.f structural reform and from the still vulnerable 
macroeconomic position of several countries. 
This issue of Supplement A reviews external trends in the 
ten CEEC having signed ( or initiated) association 
agreements with the EU (CEEC 10). Because of lack of 
data, however, the analysis is sometimes restricted to the 
Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania ( CEEC 6 ), that is, to the first six 
associated countries. 
I. Current account trends 
Largely reflecting the recovery of economic activity in the 
West and in the Visegrad countries, exports in CEEC ex-
panded rapidly in 1994. As table 1 shows, the growth of 
real exports of goods and services in CEEC 6 accelerated 
from only 0.9% in 1993 to 11.4% in 1994 and the Commis-
sion expects it to remain strong in the coming years, aver-
aging about 8% per annum until 1997. 
At the same time, imports grew in 1994 much less than had 
been expected. Despite the nascent economic recovery in 
Central and Eastern Europe, real merchandise import 
growth in CEEC 6 declined from 13.1 % in 1993 to 8.3% in 
1994. Tight macroeconomic policies restraining domestic 
demand, the lagged response of investment demand ( which 
has a relatively high import content) to the strengthening of 
economic activity and, in some countries, the imposition of 
temporary import restrictions seem to be, in general, the 
main explanations for this lower than expected import 
growth. In the case of Bulgaria, another relevant factor has 
been the significant depreciation of the real exchange rate 
that took place between mid-1993 and April 1994. 
The combination of a rebound in exports and a deceleration 
in import growth resulted in a sharp correction of the total 
current account deficit of CEEC 6 in 1994, thus reversing 
the severe deterioration that had occurred in 1993. The 
deficit declined from 4.1 % of GDP in 1993 (by far the 
highest level since the transition began) to 2.1 % of GDP in 
1994. The aggregate deficit of the CEEC I 0, for its part, de-
clined from 3.6% to 1.8% of GDP over the same period. 
This favourable average performance, however, hides a di-
vergent pattern between two groups of countries. While in 
six countries the current account improved (and in most 
cases very strongly), in the other four it deteriorated (and in 
three of them quite sharply). 
Noteworthy improvements in the current account were 
achieved in 1994 by Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slove-
nia and Poland (see table 2). The figures for Poland shown 
in table 2 in fact seriously underestimate the amelioration 
of its current account since they do not take into account the 
growing amount of unrecorded Polish exports to neigh-
bouring countries (which are currently classified under 
short-term capital inflows). According to the IMF, if esti-
mates of unrecorded trade flows are included, Poland's cur-
rent account recorded in 1994 a surplus of US$ 2.3 bn 
(2.3% of GDP), implying an improvement of about three 
percentage points of GDP relative to 1993. This is import-
ant because, given the weight of Poland, the use of these 
adjusted figures significantly affects the totals for the re-
gion. With the adjusted figures, the 1994 current account 
deficit of CEEC 10 amounts to only US$ 1.3 bn or 0.5% of 
the region's GDP. 
TABLE I : Trade flows in CEEC 6 
(% rate of change) 
1993 1994 1995(1) 1996()) 1997(1) 
Real exports of goods and 
0.9 11.4 7.1 9.2 8.0 non-factor services 
Real imports of goods and 
10.0 7.4 14.0 9.2 8.8 non-factor services 
Real merchandise exports 0.3 13.4 8.3 9.2 8.1 
Real merchandise imports 13.1 8.3 16.8 10.0 9.1 
r I I Autumn 1995 forecasts. 
Source: European Commission. 
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TABLE 2: Current account balances 
1989 1990 1991 
1. Former CSFR bn $ 0.9 -1.3 0.4 
% of GDP l.9 -2.9 1.2 
2. Czech Republic bn $ 
% of GDP 
3. Slovakia bn $ 
% of GDP 
4. Hungary bn $ -1.4 0.1 0.3 
% of GDP -5.0 0.4 0.8 
5. Poland bn $ -1.8 0.7 -2.2 
% of GDP -2.7 l.l -2.9 
6. Bulgaria bn $ -1.5 -1.0 -0.3 
% of GDP -6.8 -12.5 -4.l 
7. Romania bn $ 2.9 -1.8 -1.3 
% of GDP 13.0 -7.9 -4.7 
8. Slovenia bn $ 0.1 
% of GDP 1.0 
9. Estonia bn $ 
% of GDP 
10. Latvia bn $ 
% of GDP 
11. Lithuania bn $ 
% of GDP 
Total (1-7) bn $ -0.9 -3.3 -3.J 
% of GDP -0.4 -1.7 -l.6 
Total (1-11) bn $ 
% of GDP 
Simple average (1-11) % of GDP 
Sources: National authorities, European Commission. and IMF. 
On the negative side, Hungary's current account deficit wi-
dened again in dollar terms in 1994 and remained at a 
worryingly high 9.5% of GDP. The sharp deterioration of 
the Hungarian current account in 1993-94 resulted from a 
combination of factors. It reflected the country's high 
budget deficits, the cumulative appreciation of the real ex-
change rate between end-1990 and end-1993, and deep 
structural problems in the export sectors. But it also re-
flected factors of a more special and transitory nature, like 
the effect of the UN embargo on Serbia and Montenegro 
and the detrimental impact on agricultural production of a 
protracted drought. 
The Czech Republic, Estonia and Latvia have also exper-
ienced a deterioration of the current account in 1994. The 
Czech current account has continued to worsen rapidly in 
1995 and is expected to reach a deficit of about 3-4% in 
1995-96. As it is well known, however, the negative trend 
in the Czech current account has been more than offset by 
(and partly reflects) a strengthening of the capital account, 
resulting in the sharpest increase in official foreign ex-
change reserves experienced by any country in the region 
(see sections II and VI). Similarly, in Estonia, where im-
ports have increased sharply owing to the surge in FDI, and 
in Latvia the deterioration in the current accounts has been 
compensated and partly caused by the increase in capital 
inflows. The behaviour of the current account in these three 
countries, however, may be of some concern to the extent 
that it signals weak external competitiveness following 
several years of sustained real exchange rate appreciation. 
Import growth is estimated to have accelerated consider-
European Commission 
Autumn 1995 forecasts 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
0.3 
0.8 
0.7 0.0 -1.6 -1.5 -l.2 
2.2 0.0 -3.7 -2.8 -2.0 
-0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 
-5.4 5.7 2.2 2.l 1.5 
0.3 -3.5 -3.9 -3.l -2.8 -2.4 
0.9 -9.6 -9.5 -7.6 -6.5 -5.l 
-0.3 -2.3 -1.l -l.7 -1.7 -3.l 
-0.3 -2.7 -I.I -l.3 -I.I -1.9 
-0.8 -1. I -0.0 0.1 0.3 0.4 
-9.3 -9.8 -0.2 0.4 2.9 3.1 
-1.7 -] .4 -0.4 -l.l -1.0 -0.8 
-8.8 -5.4 -1.3 -3.5 -3.0 -2.4 
0.9 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.9 
7.5 l.2 3.4 2.5 3.3 4.1 
0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.3 
7.6 0.7 -6.4 -5.4 -8.0 -5.3 
0.0 0.2 -0.l -0.l -0.1 -0.l 
l.8 6.8 -2.5 -l.7 -1.2 -l.2 
0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
ll.0 -5.7 -3.7 -4.0 -2.7 -2.l 
-2.2 -8.2 -4.7 -7.l -6.2 -6.8 
-1.2 -4.l -2. l -2.7 -2.0 -2.0 
-1.0 -8.l -4.7 -7. l -6.2 -6.5 
-0.6 -3.6 -l.8 -2.4 -1.8 -1.7 
1.2 -2.8 -1.6 -2.2 -1.7 -I.I 
ably in 1995, responding at last to the recovery of economic 
activity in CEEC. According to the Commission's Autumn 
1995 forecasts, this more rapid expansion of imports, 
coupled with a deceleration of export growth from its 1993 
peak, will produce some deterioration in the region's cur-
rent account deficit as a percentage of GDP in 1995. But the 
deterioration will only be significant in the case of Roma-
nia, Slovakia and, as noted, the Czech Republic, and the re-
gion's current account deficit will remain significantly 
below its 1993 peak. Furthermore, although a number of 
uncertainties remain, projections suggest that the region's 
deficit will decline again in 1996-1997, stabilizing at 
around the level that had been achieved in 1994 (see table 2). 
II. Trends in official reserves 
After declining to low levels at the beginning of the transi-
tion, official international reserves in CEEC 6 recovered 
gradually in 1991-92 and have been increasing sharply 
since 1993 1, with the pace of expansion accelerating dra-
matically in the first half of 1995 (see table 3). The official 
reserves of the CEEC 10 have tripled between end-1992 
(US$ 13.6 bn) and mid-1995 (US$ 40.1 bn), and rose by a 
startling US$ 12 bn in the first six months of 1995. 
On average, official reserves in CEEC 6 represented 5 
months of imports in mid-1995, compared with only 1.9 
months at end-1990. The average import cover ratio for the 
Official reserves increased by US$ 6.5 bn in 1993 despite the record 
current account deficit reached that year. reflecting the improvement 
in the capital account (see section VI). 
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TABLE 3: Gross official reserves ( end of period) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 June 1995 
1. Former CSFR(l) bn $ 2.3 0.5 1.4 1.3 
months of importsC2) 2.4 0.6 1.3 I.I 
2. Czech Republic bn $ 0.9 3.9 6.2 11.8 
months of imports(2) 1.3 2.7 4.0 7.4 
3. Slovakia bn $ 0.5 0.9 2.2 2.815) 
months of importsi21 I.I 1.2 3.0 3.4151 
4. Hungary bn $ 1.7 1.2 4.0 4.4 6.7 6.8 7.6 
months of importsC2) 3.5 2.3 5.3 5.2 7.1 7.2 7.8 
5. Poland bn $ 2.5 4.7 3.8 4.6 4.6 6.5 11.016) 
months of importsC21 3.3 5.5 3.3 3.5 3.0 36 5.8161 
6. Bulgaria bn $ 1.2 0.2 0.4 1.2 1.0 1.4 1.7 
months of imports<2J 2.4 0.4 1.8 2.8 2.1 3.0 3.5 
7. Romania<3J bn $ 2.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 2.0 1.8 
months of impo11si21 6.0 0.8 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.6 2.l 
8. S1oveniaC4J bn $ 0.l 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.8 
months of impo11s(2) 0.3 1.2 I .3 2.3 2.5 
9. Estonia bn $ 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 
months of imports<2) 4.5 4.8 3.3 3.2 
10. Latvia bn $ 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.5 
months of importsC21 1.5 4.4 4.5 3.3 
11. Lithuania bn $ O.l 0.4 0.5 0.6 
months of impo11s(21 l.2 2.3 2.8 3.0 
Total {1-7) bn $ 10.2 7.0 10.3 12.3 18.0 25.0 36.7 
Total (2-11) bn $ 13.6 20.l 28.l 40.l 
Average import cover (simple average) 
(1-7) 3.5 1.9 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.9 5.0 
(1-11) 2.4 3. l 3.6 4.2 
ill Convertible reserves only. 
(2.) Imports of goods and services. 
n1 Foreign exchange reserves of the banking system. 
14) Excluding claims on gold and other foreign assets held by the National Bank of Yugoslavia at the time of the break-up of the federation. 
(."i) August 1995. (6) July I 995. 
Sources: National data, IMF, EBRD, and UN Economic Commission for Europe. 
CEEC 10, for its part, has increased from 2.4 months at 
end-1992 to 4.2 months at mid-1995. 
Although practically all countries have benefited from this 
positive trend, the rise in reserves has been increasingly 
concentrated in a few countries since end-1994, with the 
Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary largely being re-
sponsible for the sharp improvement recorded in the re-
gion's average import cover ratio in the first half of 1995. 
Furthermore, the average import cover ratio for the region 
hides important differences among countries. The Czech 
Republic, Poland and Hungary all stood out with ratios of 
at least 6 months of imports in mid-1995. By contrast, Ro-
mania (where reserves fell significantly in the first half of 
1995) and, to a lesser extent, the Baltic states continue to 
have a somewhat vulnerable foreign exchange position, 
with import cover ratios of 3 months or less2. 
III. Foreign debt 
Except in 1994, the aggregate gross convertible debt of 
CEEC 6 has increased in nominal terms every year since 
the transition began. But the region's foreign debt/GDP 
ratio, which is a much more relevant indicator of the econ-
omic burden represented by the debt, has fallen by one third 
between end-1990 and mid-1995 (see table 4). The re-
gion's average debt service-over-exports ratio improved 
markedly in 1991-92 and has approximately stabilized 
since then (see graph I). 
The improvement in the region's average debt ratios, how-
ever, gives an over-optimistic picture of foreign debt 
trends for three reasons. Firstly, it is basically explained by 
the impressive decline in the ratios of Poland and Bulgaria. 
This is particularly true for the debt/GDP ratio. The Polish 
and Bulgarian debt/GDP ratios have halved since they re-
ached their peaks in, respectively, 1990 and 1992. In all the 
other CEEC 10, the debt/GDP ratios have experienced some 
deterioration in recent years (although in many cases the de-
terioration has been moderate and from low initial levels). 
Secondly, the decline in the region's foreign debt/GDP 
ratio is partly accounted for by the appreciation of the real 
exchange rates, which tends to increase the value of the US 
dollar-denominated GDPs. Following the sharp devalu-
ations of the early transition years, the real exchange rates 
of many CEEC 10 have tended to show, beyond short-term 
fluctuations, an appreciating trend. Part of this real appreci-
ation probably reflects an equilibrium phenomenon due to 
2 The import cover ratio shown for Slovenia in table 3 (2.5 at 
mid-1995) is also relatively low but the reserves data used in this 
table for Slovenia exclude unresolved claims on the gold and other 
foreign assets held by the National Bank of Yugoslavia at the time of 
the break-up of the federation. 
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TABLE4: Gross convertible foreign debt 
1989 1990 
1. Former CSFR bn $ 7.9 8.4 
in% of GDP 14.3 14.4 
2. Czech Republic bn $ 
in% of GDP 
3. Slovakia bn $ 
in% of GDP 
4. Hungary bn $ 20.4 21.3 
in% of GDP 70.3 64.8 
5. Poland bn $ 40.2 48.9 
in% of GDP 60.2 78.5 
6. Bulgaria<!) bn $ 9.2 10.2 
in% of GDP 42.0 134.0 
7. Romania bn $ 0.8 I.I 
in% of GDP 3.6 4.9 
8. Slovenia (2) bn $ 
in% of GDP 
9. Estonia bn $ 
in% of GDP 
10. Latvia bn $ 
in% of GDP 
11. Lithuania bn $ 
in% of GDP 
Total (1-7) bn $ 78.5 89.9 
% of GDP 52.3 67.1 
Simple average (1-7) % of GDP 38.1 59.3 
Total (2-11) bn $ 
% of GDP 
Average debt/GDP ratio of 
severely-indebted low-income countries<3l 124.0 129.7 
severely-indebted middle-income countriesl31 51.3 48.3 
developing and transition countries 34.5 34.0 
11 l Including non-convertible debt. 
1991 1992 
9.8 9.5 
25.6 26.9 
6.9 
25.4 
2.8 
26.0 
22.7 21.4 
73.5 58.3 
48.3 48.2 
71.5 53.7 
11.6 12.5 
147.0 151.0 
2.1 3.4 
7.6 17.5 
1.9 1.7 
14.7 14.4 
0.04 
4.2 
0.04 
3.0 
0.1 
5.1 
94.5 95.0 
66.8 55.5 
65.0 59.8 
97.1 
46.2 
128.1 122.1 
49.9 47.9 
36.4 37.7 
1993 
8.5 
27.4 
3.4 
30.6 
24.6 
66.6 
48.7 
52.7 
12.8 
124.0 
4.4 
l6.9 
1.9 
15.5 
0.14 
8.6 
0.23 
10.0 
0.28 
9.8 
102.4 
49.5 
53.0 
104.9 
46.5 
117.2 
42.2 
39.7 
1994 
10.7 
29.6 
4.0 
31.7 
28.5 
69.5 
42.2 
43.3 
II.I 
111.0 
4.9 
16.3 
2.3 
16.5 
0.17 
6.5 
0.36 
10.0 
0.44 
7.5 
101.4 
45.7 
50.2 
104.7 
43.0 
June 1995 
15.0 
33.4 
5.0 
34.4 
33.0 
77.1 
45.Jl4) 
39.Ji4) 
10.2 
820 
5.2 
16.0 
2.6 
14.7 
0.23 
6.2 
0.37 
9.0 
0.58 
7.2 
113.5 
44.5 
47.0 
117.3 
41.7 
12 1 Excluding the part of the debt from the former Yugoslovia to be allocated to Slovenia and debt to the !MF. 
111 As classified in World Bank I 1994). 
141 July. 
Sources: National autho1ities, !MF. and World Bank (1994). 
GRAPH 1 : Average debt service-over-exports ratio in 
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12) As a percentage of exports of goods and services. Debt service includes 
interest payments and amortizations. 
Sources: National authorities, World Bank and !MF. 
1994 
the strong initial undervaluations and/or to an increase in 
the medium-term equilibrium real exchange rate3. But, to 
the extent that not all the real appreciation is a movement 
towards the equilibrium level, the decline in the debt/GDP 
ratios is temporarily being exaggerated by an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate that will eventually be corrected. 
Thirdly, the improvement in the region's average ratios 
hides a substantial deterioration since 1993 in Hungary's 
ratios from already very high levels. Contrary to what has 
happened for example in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
the increase in the Hungarian gross debt has only partly 
been offset by the rise in official reserves, leading to an in-
crease in net debt. The jump in Hungarian net debt reflects 
the huge deficits recorded by the current account since 
1993, which the non-debt creating capital inflows have 
only been able to finance in part. Hungary's debt service 
indicators have also worsened significantly. Since 
mid-1995, Hungary's current account has been responding 
to the stabilization measures adopted by the government in 
March 1995, but its deficit is projected to remain above the 
net inflow of FDI until 1996. Hungary's net debt will there-
fore continue to increase, underlining a still delicate bal-
ance of payments position. 
See Halpern and Wyplosz ( 1995). 
At an estimated 44.5% of GDP in mid-1995, the aggregate 
foreign debt/GDP ratio of CEEC 10 remains somew~at 
above the average ratio found in non-developed countnes 
and in highly-indebted middle-income countries. On the 
other hand, with the exception of Hungary, there has been a 
positive "redistribution" of the foreign debt burden across 
countries, with the debt generally increasing where it was 
low and falling where it was high. CEEC 10 can now be 
classified in three distinct groups according to the import-
ance of their foreign debts: i) Hungary and Bulgaria have 
both very high debt/GDP ratios ( of about 80% ); ii) Poland 
is at an intermediate level with a ratio slightly below 40%; 
iii) the rest of the CEEC 10 have an average debt/GDP of 
only 17 %, with the Baltic states enjoying ratios below 
10%. 
The positive evolution of the average debt and debt service 
ratios since 1991 has been facilitated by the substantial 
debt relief granted by the Paris Club to Poland in that year, 
and, more recently, by the signing in July 1994 and Sep-
tember 1994 by Bulgaria and Poland, respectively, of debt 
and debt service reduction (DDSR) agreements with their 
commercial bank creditors. Slovenia has also made sub-
stantial progress in normalizing relations with its creditors. 
It has agreed with the Paris Club on a set of principles for 
allocating its share of the official bilateral debt of the 
former Yugoslavia and, in June 1995, it reached an agree-
ment in principle with commercial banks to assume 18% of 
the outstanding commercial debt of the former Yugoslavia, 
an agreement that still has to be approved by two-thirds of 
the creditors and ratified by the Slovenian Parliament. 
While the implementation of these allocation agreements 
will show up as an increase in Slovenia's recorded debt, the 
country's debt burden will remain relatively low. 
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IV. Ratings and market access 
The improvement in the balance of payments and, more 
generally, in the macroeconomic situation has had a fa-
vourable effect on the perceived creditworthiness of sev-
eral CEEC. Moody's and Standard & Poor's have both up-
graded the Czech Republic several times since they first 
assigned to this country an investment grade mark in 1993, 
in the wake of the dissolution of the CSFR (see table 5). 
The latest of these positive reassessments took place in No-
vember 1995, when Standard & Poor's increased the Czech 
Republic's rating from BBB+ to A. The Czech Republic, 
which had already been assigned an A- rating by the Lon-
don agency IBCA in August 1995, has thus become one of 
the few non-developed countries that can boast an "A" 
level mark from a major rating agency. In April 1995, Stan-
dard & Poor's upgraded Slovakia's rating from BB- to 
BB+, and in May 1995 Moody's awarded to Slovakia an in-
vestment grade rating (Baa3 ). Poland, for its part, obtained 
in June 1995 its first assessments by these two US rating 
agencies. Standard & Poor's assigned to Poland a BB rat-
ing and Moody's a Baa3, making of Poland the only 
country to have received an investment grade mark follow-
ing a Brady-style debt reduction operation. There are, 
therefore, already three CEEC enjoying an investment 
grade mark from at least one of the two leading interna-
tional rating agencies. 
By contrast, the negative evolution shown by Hungary's 
current account and foreign debt since 1993 has not only 
prevented the country from reaching the investment grade 
category but also led Standard & Poor's to revise its rating 
outlook for Hungary from stable to negative in February 
1995. Romania, for its part, decided in December 1995 to 
delay seeking a sovereign debt rating until spring 1996 due 
to the recent deterioration of its current account and reserve 
position. In mid-1995, the Romanian authorities had in-
vited the major international rating agencies to assign to 
TABLE 5 : Credit ratings assigned by Moody's and Standard & Poor's to CEEC(l) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Moody's: 
FormerCSFR Bal (Jan.) 
Czech Republic Baa3 (March) 
Slovakia 
Hungary Baa2 (July) Bal (July) 
Poland 
Standard & Poor's : 
Czech Republic BBB (July) 
Slovakia 
Hungary BB+ (Apr.) 
Poland 
! I J Long-term foreign currency ratings. The ratings are ranked in descending order according to the degree of creditworthiness as follows: 
fnvestment grade 
Non-investment grade 
Default grade 
Moody's 
Aaa, Aa, A, Baa 
Ba, B 
Caa, Ca, C 
Standard & Poor's 
AAA, AA, A, BBB 
BB,B 
CCC,CC,C,D 
1994 1995 
Baa2 (May) Baal (Sept.) 
Baa3 (May) 
Baa3 (June) 
A(Nov.J BBB+ (July) (stable outlook) 
BB- (Febr.) BB+ (Apr.) (stable outlook) 
(Outlook revised in April 
from stable to negative) 
BB (June) 
(positive outlook) 
In addition, borrowers within a given grade arc often differentiated by attaching either numbers from I (highest creditworthiness) to 3 (l\.1oody's), or+ and~ sings (Standard & Poor's). 
Sources: Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's rating agencies. 
-
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TABLE6: Euromoney and institutional investor country risk ratings and rankings 
EUROMONEY 
--------
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
------ ----------
March Sept. March Sept. March Sept. 
-- - - - - -
--- --- - ----
Czech Repuhlic(l) Credit rating(2) 61.7 54.1 53.4 54.9 64.5 66.2 68.2 73.9 69.3 
Position in ranking(3) 39 35 49 48 43 40 39 35 41 
Slovakia(1> Credit rating (2) 61.7 54.1 44 45.3 47.2 46.3 48 57.9 60.21 
Position in ranking(3) 39 35 58 56 63 64 66 53 51 
Hungary Credit rating (2) 60.8 52 54.5 54.9 61.6 60.7 59.8 60.2 63.8 
Position in ranking(3) 40 44 46 47 46 44 46 50 44 
Poland Credit rating(2) 43 50.4 36.5 35.8 44.6 41.8 45.1 47.9 48.4 
Position in rankingO l 73 57 71 78 72 80 73 71 72 
Romania Credit rating (2) 43.3 30.7 35.8 36.9 43.2 43 43.3 48.7 50.4 
Position in ranking(3) 71 89 72 66 75 74 77 68 64 
Bulgaria Credit rating(2l 34.7 22.6 29.9 24.8 28.5 38.I 37.7 40.7 40.8 
Position in ranking (3) 90 114 91 122 125 88 98 90 90 
Slovenia Credit rating<2) 34.2 42.2 47.6 43.1 53.1 61.3 60.5 
Position in ranking(3 > 74 63 61 73 53 47 50 
Estonia Credit rating(2) 24.2 23.4 28.9 33.5 35 49.4 46.1 
Position in ranking(3) 117 126 122 105 102 66 76 
Latvia Credit rating<2l 23 21.7 26 33.5 30 35.6 31.1 
Position in ranking(3 > 123 133 132 104 125 106 116 
Lithuania Credit rating(2) 24.1 21.4 26.6 32.7 31.3 35.4 31 
Position in ranking<3 > 118 134 130 110 121 108 118 
Average rating CEEC6 50.9 44.0 42.4 42.I 48.3 49.3 50.3 54.9 55.5 
CEEC 10 36.0 36.I 41.9 43.9 45.2 51.1 50.2 
Average position of CEEC 10 in ranking 81.9 87.3 86.9 78.2 80 69.4 72.2 
( number of countries rated) 132 130 169 169 170 167 167 187 181 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
March Sept. March Sept. March Sept. March Sept. March Sept. 
Czech Republic(ll Credit rating<2) 50.2 48.3 47.1 46.1 44.6 46.6 49.7 52.8 55.8 58.4 
Position in ranking(3l 32 34 37 39 42 40 40 39 33 30 
SlovakiaO > Credit rating(2) 50.2 48.3 47.1 46.1 31 30.6 31.6 33.1 33.2 35.7 
Position in ranking(3) 32 34 37 39 57 57 59 59 61 59 
Hungary Credit rating(2) 41.1 40.9 41.7 42.3 44.3 44.8 46.1 46.2 46.4 45 
Position in rankingOl 41 42 42 43 43 43 43 44 45 48 
Poland Credit rating<2) 21.7 24.5 25.6 24.7 26.9 28.6 30.5 33.1 35.7 37.6 
Position in ranking<3) 73 69 70 69 69 62 62 58 57 56 
Romania Credit rating(2) 27.9 26.7 25.6 24.8 24.2 24.4 25.4 26.2 28.1 29.7 
Position in rankingO I 60 64 69 68 73 75 76 74 73 71 
Bulgaria Credit rating<2) 27.8 22.2 21.1 19.8 18.9 19.5 19.8 20.8 21.9 22.2 
Position in rankingO) 62 74 81 86 91 89 91 95 93 94 
Slovenia Credit rating(2) 20.4 22.5 28.6 33.4 36.7 39.5 42.4 
Position in rankingOl 83 75 61 57 56 52 50 
Estonia Credit rating(2) 25.7 22.l 21.4 20.9 20.7 23.6 25.4 26.3 
Position in rankingOl 68 74 81 84 88 86 79 79 
Latvia Credit rating<2l 23.9 21.4 19.5 20 19.6 21.3 22.6 23.4 
Position in ranking(3) 72 77 89 87 94 92 91 89 
Lithuania Credit rating(2) 23.7 20.7 18.9 19 18.4 20 21.7 22.9 
Position in ranking<3 l 73 80 91 93 97 96 95 90 
Average rating CEEC6 36.5 35.2 34.7 34.0 31.7 32.4 33.9 35.4 36.9 38.1 
CEEC 10 28.8 27.2 28.3 29.5 31.4 33.0 34.4 
Average position of CEEC 10 in ranking 65.8 71.1 69.l 70.7 69.9 67.9 66.6 
(number of countries rated) Ill 113 119 126 127 133 135 135 135 135 
1 I I Until 1991 in the case of "Euromoney" and until I 992 in the case of "Institutional Investor". rating or position in the ranking assigned to the former CSFR. 
lei Countries are rated on a scale of zero to 100. with JOO representing the least chance of default. 
( 31 The higher the ranking number, the lower the degree of creditworthiness of the country. 
Sources: "Euromoney" and ''Institutional Investor" magazines. 
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TABLE 7 : Access of CEEC to the international capital markets 
(in millions of U.S. dollars) 
International bond issues 
FormerCSFR 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Poland 
International equity issues 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Estonia 
Medium- and long- term syndicated bank loan commitmentsOJ 
FormerCSFR 
Czech Republic 
Slovakia 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Slovenia 
Estonia 
1 l l Excluding cofinancing facilities. 
Sources: !MF ( 1995) and European Commission ( I 994). 
the country a rating ahead of its first Eurobond issue, orig-
inally planned for late 1995 or early 1996. 
The widely monitored country risk rankings and ratings 
regularly produced by the Euromoney and the Institutional 
Investor magazines4 also suggest a significant improve-
ment since 1993 in the perception by foreigners of the 
country risk involved when investing in CEEC. After de-
clining in the first years of the transition and reaching their 
trough at the beginning of 1993, the average rating of 
CEEC 10 has been consistently increasing and already ex-
ceeds the pre-transition level (see table 6). As one would 
expect, the improvement in the rating has been particularly 
marked for the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The average 
position of CEEC 10 in the rankings has also improved, al-
though the improvement is partially masked by the in-
crease in the number of countries rated by the magazines. 
The amelioration in the ratings has been translated into an 
easier access to the international capital markets, although 
issuance activity in the international bond and equity 
markets continues to be concentrated in a handful of coun-
tries (see table 7). 
International bonds: Following the debt deal with com-
mercial banks and the assignment of favourable ratings by 
Moody's and Standard & Poor's, Poland made a successful 
comeback to the international capital markets in June 1995 
through the issuance by the government of a 5-year, US$ 
250 mn Eurobond. Slovakia has also taken advantage of its 
stronger macroeconomic position to tap the international 
bond market. Thus, the National Bank of Slovakia placed 
4 These ratings are partially (Euromoney) or totally (Institutional In-
vestor) based on polls of country risk analysts at major international 
banks and other institutions. 
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1989 
879 
879 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
1990 1991 1992 
1263 1511 1614 
375 276 129 
888 1235 1485 
68 81 21 
68 81 21 
n.a. 502 483 
n.a. 16 58 
n.a. 172 269 
n.a. 236 105 
n.a. 37 51 
n.a. 41 
1993 
5735 
694 
240 
4801 
9 
8 
?HI 
170 
252 
236 
115 
8 
1994 
2404 
400 
275 
1729 
218 
10 
200 
7 
566 
10 
938 
381 
60 
150 
114 
4 
-
First half 
1995 
2028 
1778 
250 
159 
cp 
113 
14 
960 
240 
287 
267 
150 
16 
in the Samurai market two bonds of about US$ 250 mn 
each in September 1993 and July 1994, respectively. In 
addition, Calex, a Slovak state-owned manufacturing 
company, issued in January 1994 a US$ 21 mn Eurobond 
carrying a guarantee from the Slovak government. Latvia, 
for its part, entered the market in August 1995 with a JPY 4 
bn bond privately placed among Japanese and European in-
stitutional investors. Also. the normalization of Slovenia's 
relations with its creditors is expected to open the way for 
the issuance of international bonds by this country. 
While bond issues by the Czech Republic declined in 
1994-1995 reflecting the cessation of sovereign issues5, 
some Czech companies have managed to issue Eurobonds 
at relatively low spreads. Despite investors' concern about 
worsening foreign debt indicators, Hungary remained the 
largest sovereign borrower among CEEC in 1994 and in 
the first half of 1995. It placed bonds to the amount of US$ 
1.7 bn in 1994 (sharply down from US$4.8 bn in 1993) and 
of US$ 1.8 bn in the first half of 1995. 
International equity: Total international equity issues by 
CEEC increased quite sharply in I 994, but this increase 
took place from insignificant levels and is largely ac-
counted for by Hungary, which is practically the only 
country that had previously been active in this market. It 
should be noted, however, that companies from the Czech 
Republic, Estonia and Romania entered the market for the 
first time in 1994. Also, in 1995, Slovakia launched its first 
international equity issue. 
5 The interruption of sovereign bond issues has been one of the policy 
responses to the surge in capital inflows experienced by the Czech 
Republic. 
Commercial bank loans: International bank lending to 
CEEC 10 recovered strongly in 1994 and the first half of 
1995. New medium- and long-term syndicated loan com-
mitments increased from US$ 781 mn in 1993 to US$ 2223 
mn in 1994 and US$ 960 mn in the first half of 1995. The 
expansion of new bank loans has been concentrated in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland but other countries 
have also benefited from it. In 1994, Slovakia received its 
first syndicated loan commitment and Bulgaria returned to 
the market after a two-year absence. Also, the Romanian 
central bank easily obtained a 12-month syndicated loan in 
the second quarter of 1995. The loan, which had initially 
been arranged for US$ 75 mn, was oversubscribed and had 
its amount finally raised to US$ 150 mn. In addition, bal-
ance of payments data indicate that non-syndicated loans 
directly granted by foreign banks to local enterprises have 
been rising considerably in several countries, and in par-
ticular in the Czech Republic and Hungary, since 1994. 
V. Foreign direct investment 
After increasing rapidly in 1992 and 1993, net FDI into 
CEEC I 0, measured on a cash basis and in dollar terms, fell 
by about 10% in 1994 (see table 8)6. This decline, however, 
is more than explained by the sharp reduction in the net FDI 
inflow received by Hungary. In fact, net FDI into the CEEC 
10 excluding Hungary expanded by 40% in 1994. The rate 
of growth was particularly high in Romania and Latvia, al-
though in both cases the increase took place from low 1993 
levels. In Estonia and Slovenia, there was a continuation of 
the positive trend seen in recent years, and the Czech Re-
public experienced a substantial recovery following the 
sharp decline recorded in 1993. 
FDI into the region remains highly concentrated in a few 
countries, with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland 
alone accounting for 66% of total net FDI into CEEC I O in 
1994. But the degree of concentration continued to decline 
in 1994. In 1993, these same three countries had accounted 
for 84% of net FDI, and Hungary and the former CSFR 
alone had received about 90% of the region's net FDI in 
1990-91. The tendency towards a lower geographical con-
centration is also evident in the data on per capita FDI, 
which show an increasingly strong performance in several 
small countries. Despite this increasing geographical di-
versification, however, the aggregate figures for the region 
continue to be very much affected by developments in 
Hungary and the Czech Republic, and in particular by the 
pace of privatization in these two countries. For example, if 
the sale by the Hungarian government to foreign investors 
6 Cash flow data on FDI flows are taken from balance of payments sta-
tistics and normally measure only investments made in cash through 
the banking system. They tend to understate actual FDI (particularly 
the accumulated stocks) because they do not incorporate either "in 
kind" contributions or reinvested earnings. However, they are the 
only type of statistics on FDI which exist for all CEEC and are avail-
able on a timely basis. Data on FDicommitments based on the foreign 
component of statutory capital compiled by the UN Economic Com-
mission for Europe also suggest a significant slowdown in total FDI 
inflows into CEEC 10 in 1994. See UN Economic Commission for 
Europe ( 1995 b ). 
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GRAPH 2 : Net FDI inflows received by CEEC 10 between 1992 
and 1994 : country shares 
Czech. Rep. 
20.7 % 
Slovakia __ ...... 
4.0% __ 
Lithuania 
0.8% 
Latvia 
2.3 % 
/ 
Estonia 
4.3 % 
' Slovenia Bulgaria 
3.4 % 1.8 % 
Poland 
12.8 % 
Source: National balance of payments statistics, !MF, and European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (1995). 
of a 30% stake in the Hungarian telecommunications com-
pany (Mataf), amounting to US$ 875 mn, had taken place 
in early 1994 instead of late 1993, net FDI into the region 
would have shown practically no growth in 1993 and a very 
sharp increase in 1994, that is, a profile almost opposite to 
that displayed in table 8. 
Despite the important expansion of FDI flows into the re-
gion since 1990, FDI continues to represent for most coun-
tries a relatively small fraction of their respective GDPs. 
For the CEEC 10 as a whole, net FDI was equivalent to 
only 1.5% of the region's GDP in 1994, which compares 
GRAPH 3 : Net FDI inflows into CEEC 10 
% share of total FDI inflows received by non-developed countries 
8 ,-- -- -- - - -- - - --- -- - - - - - - - - -
7l ~ 
I 
61 
I 
5 I 
I 41 
31 
I 
I 
2 
1990 1991 1992 
Source: World Bank (1994) and data on table 8. 
1993 1994 
-10-
TABLE 8: Net foreign direct investment (on a cash basis, in million of US dollars unless otherwise indicated) 
Forecasts(! l Annual per capita Net FDI as 
net inflow a% 
of GDP 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1992 1993 1994 in 1994 
FormerCSFR 199 594 1083 69 
Czech Republic 983 542 749 2200 1500 95 53 73 2.2 
Slovakia IOO 156 187 200 225 19 29 35 1.5 
Hungary 337 1474 1471 2329 1147 2500 1700 143 226 111 2.8 
Poland 88 117 284 580 542 900 1250 7 15 14 0.5 
Romania -18 37 73 95 341 400 450 3 4 15 LI 
Bulgaria 4 56 42 55 I05 115 130 5 7 12 LI 
Slovenia -2 41 113 116 140 160 175 58 70 80 
Estonia 58 160 253 200 200 36 100 158 9.5 
Latvia 43 51 155 165 175 16 19 57 3.9 
Lithuania 10 23 60 70 90 3 6 16 1.7 
Total CEEC 10 608 2319 3177 4107 3679 69!0 5895 30 39 35 1.5 
(I) Tentative forecasts. 
Sources: National balance of payments statistics, European Commission. IMF, and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1995). 
unfavourably with, for example, an average FDI/GDP ratio 
of about 3% of GDP in the dynamic economies of South 
East Asia in the period 1989-92. Also, after increasing sig-
nificantly between 1990 and 1992, the share of CEEC 10 in 
total FDI flows into non-developed economies declined in 
1993 and 1994 (see graph 3). 
Projections for 1995-96 point towards a strong recovery of 
FDI into the region. But, again, these forecasts crucially 
rely on assumptions regarding the privatization process in 
the major countries. In particular, the projections assume 
that, following the impasse in 1994 and the first half of 
1995, privatization in Hungary will accelerate, with the 
government achieving before end-1996 much of its current 
plan to sell majority stakes in large companies of the en-
ergy, telecommunications and banking sectors. They also 
incorporate the following decisions taken by the Czech 
government in the summer of 1995: I) to sell a 27% stake 
(worth US$ 1.23 bn) in SPT Telecom to a foreign investor, 
the largest privatization operation conducted in the Czech 
Republic to date; 2) to sell a 49% stake in Czech Refineries 
to a consortium of foreign oil companies; and 3) to prepare 
plans to privatize additional stakes in 53 big companies (in-
cluding the largest commercial bank, the largest saving 
bank, the power generating conglomerate CEZ, the steel 
company Vitkovice and a major petrochemical group). 
This is reflected in the sharp increase in FDI inflows ex-
pected for the Czech Republic in 1995-96. Finally, the pro-
jections assume that the significant pick-up of FDI into 
Poland that occurred in the first nine months of 19957 will 
continue. If Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland are 
excluded, the rise in FDI inflows into the region projected 
for 1995-96 is relatively moderate. 
VI. The capital account in historical perspective 
The magnitude of the net capital inflows (outflows) re-
ceived by a country can be approximated by the difference 
7 FDI into Poland (in cash) reached in the first nine months of 1995 
US$ 577 nm, compared to US$ 390 mn in the same period of 1994. 
between the recorded current account balance and the re-
corded change in official reserves8. Table 9 has made this 
evaluation for each of the CEEC 10 as well as for the CEEC 
6 as a whole for the period 1989-June 1995. 
The results shown in table 9 are interesting in several re-
spects. First, they indicate that in spite of capital flight and 
the interruption of new international bank lending that 
characterized the beginning of the transition, the aggregate 
capital account of CEEC 6 was in balance in 1990. The 
relatively sharp decline in official reserves that took place 
that year (US$ 3.2 bn) reflected almost exactly the large 
current account deficit run by CEEC 6. Capital flight, the 
interruption of new commercial bank loans and the debt re-
payment obligations actually honoured seem to have been 
offset by the provision of official assistance9, the accu-
mulation of arrears and the rescheduling of debts by Bulga-
ria 10 and Poland, and, to a lesser extent, the expansion of 
FOi inflows into Hungary and the former CSFR (see sec-
tion VII). However, it must also be noted that a significant 
part of the capital flight probably took the form of export 
under-reporting and import over-reporting. To the extent 
that this was the case, the current account deficit shown in 
table 9 exaggerates the actual deficit and part of the 1990 
decline in reserves does reflect the existence of a negative 
capital account. 
In 1991, a sharp improvement in the capital account of 
CEEC 6 took place. In that year, the aggregate current ac-
count, which had been negatively affected by the dismantl-
ing of the CMEA trading system, including the shift to 
world price levels and to convertible currency settle-
ment, remained at relatively high levels. However, official 
8 
9 
Strictly speaking, the difference between the current account balance 
and the change in official reserves is equal to the capital account plus 
the item "net errors and omissions". 
In 1990, Hungary became the first transition country to receive mac-
ro-financial assistance from the international community. The size of 
the assistance package was important, involving IMF and World 
Bank lending, and substantial additional assistance from the EU and 
other bilateral donors. 
IO In March 1990, Bulgaria declared a moratorium on its external debt. 
reservesrecoveredstrongly(by US$ 3. 3 bn)reflectingan 
aggregate net capital inflow of US$ 6.4 bn (3.3% of the 
combined GDP of CEEC 6). This improvement in the capi-
tal account was largely explained by an important increase 
in official assistance: the balance of payments support 
operations of the IMP/World Bank and the EU/G-24 to 
CEEC gathered momentum, and the Paris Club granted 
Poland debt and debt service reduction on exceptional 
terms. Also, there was a further (US$ 1.7 bn) expansion of 
FD I inflows into the region ( again concentrated in Hungary 
and the former CSFR). 
In 1992, both the capital account surplus and, to a lesser ex-
tent, the current account deficit declined in CEEC 6 but, 
since the former continued to exceed the latter, reserves 
rose again. Then, in 1993, the capital account improved 
dramatically, reaching a net inflow of US$ 13.9 bn (or 6.9% 
of GDP) and allowing these countries to finance both the 
record current account deficit of that year and a US$ 5. 7 bn 
increase in official reserves. This very positive trend in the 
capital account of CEEC 6 has continued until at least 
mid-1995, with the surge in capital inflows accelerating 
again abruptly in the first half of 1995. In the first half of 
1995, CEEC 6 are estimated to have received a net capital 
inflow equivalent (on an annual basis) to 9.7% of projected 
GDP. Given that the current account deficit declined sig-
nificantly after 1993, the bulk of the net capital inflow re-
ceived by these countries since 1994 has translated into an 
increase in reserves. 
TABLE 9 : Capital account of CEEC : 1990 - June 1995( 1 l 
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1990 
1. Former CSFR in bn US$ -0.5 
in% of GDP -1.1 
2. Czech Republic in bn US$ 
in% of GDP 
3. Slovakia in bn US$ 
in% of GDP 
4. Hungary in bn US$ -0.6 
in% of GDP -2.4 
5. Poland in bn US$ 1.6 
in% of GDP 2.5 
6. Bulgaria in bn US$ 0.0 
in% of GDP 0.0 
7. Romania in bn US$ -0.3 
in% of GDP -1.3 
8. Slovenia in bn US$ 
in% of GDP 
9. Estonia in bn US$ 
in% of GDP 
10.Latvia in bn US$ 
in% of GDP 
11. Lithuania in bn US$ 
in% of GDP 
Total (1-7) in bn US$ 0.1 
in% of GDP 0.2 
When expressed as a percentage of GDP, the magnitude of 
the net capital inflow to CEEC is considerably larger than 
that observed in most countries of Latin America and Asia 
during their capital inflow surge episodes of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. In the period 1990-92, the eight most dy-
namic economies of South Asia obtained on average a net 
capital inflow of about 4% of GDP, with only three coun-
tries (Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) receiving net in-
flows of 5% of GDP or more 11 . This compares with an av-
erage annual surplus of 7.3% of GDP for the CEEC 6 
between 1993 and mid-1995, and with the fact that five 
CEEC 10 obtained average net inflows of 6% of GDP or 
more during that period (see table 9). 
The surge in capital inflows has been particularly marked 
in the Czech Republic and Hungary, both as a percentage of 
GDP and in absolute values. Estonia has also experienced a 
very high net inflow relative to the size of its economy, an 
inflow fundamentally explained by the boom in FDI in-
flows, which reached 9.5% of GDP in 1994. In the Czech 
Republic, the strength of the capital inflow has raised con-
cerns about possible negative macroeconomic effects 
(difficulties in sterilizing its monetary effect, overheating, 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, deterioration of the 
current account, etc.). In the first half of 1995, the net capi-
tal inflows received by the Czech Republic amounted (at an 
II See Calvo, Leiderman and Reinhart (1993). page 25, table 3. 
1991 1992 1993 1994 First half Total ac-
1995 cumulated 
since 1993 
0.5 -0.4 
1.5 -1.1 
2.3 2.3 6.3 10.9 
7.2 h.8 15.1(21 9.7<31 
1.0 0.6 0.3 1.9 
9.0 4.9 4.5(2) h.1<31 
2.5 0.1 5.8 4.0 2.8 12.6 
6.7 0.3 15.9 9.7 13.5(2) 13.0131 
1.3 1.1 2.3 3.0 5.3 10.6 
1.7 1.1 2.7 3.0 9.2121 5.oOJ 
0.5 1.6 0.9 0.4 0.3 1.6 
6.8 18.6 8.0 3.8 4.8(2) 5.s<31 
1.5 1.9 1.6 1.4 0.6 3.6 
5.4 9.8 6.2 4.6 3.8(2) 4.9(3) 
-0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
-2.4 -0.8 1.4 2.4(2) 1.0<31 
0.2 0.3 0.1 0.6 
14.0 11.3 5.4(2) 10.2131 
0.1 0.2 -0.03 0.3 
4.5 5.8 -0.4(2) .uOI 
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.8 
14.3 5.1 1.5<2> 9.0<31 
6.4 4.2 13.9 11.7 15.6 41.2 
3.3 2.5 6.9 5.2 9.7'2) 7.3(3) 
1 I l Net capital inflows received by the country plus "net errors and omissions". Obtained as the difference between the recorded current account balance and the recon.lcd change in 
official international reserves. 
12J As a percentage of half of l 995's projected GDP 
rlJ Average annual net capital inflow/GDP received since 1993. 
Source: Information in tables 2 and 3. 
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annual rate) to an impressive 15.1% of the country's 1995 
projected GDP. In Hungary and Estonia, the increase in capi-
tal inflows has been accompanied, as noted, by a sharp 
worsening of the current accounts and, as a result, the do-
mestic monetary repercussions of the inflows have been 
less important. In Slovenia, by contrast, the combination of 
a weaker capital inflow and a sizeable current account sur-
plus has obliged the authorities to engage in massive steril-
ization operations to keep their monetary programme on 
course. 
To summarize, three main conclusions can be drawn from 
the analysis above. First, except perhaps in 1990, the capi-
tal account of CEEC 6 has never been in deficit during the 
transition period. Second, the transition period can be di-
vided into two distinct periods as far as the capital account 
is concerned: I) between 1990 and 1992, the annual capital 
account showed on average a moderate surplus ( equivalent 
to 2% of GDP) which allowed CEEC 6 to finance their cur-
rent account deficits and finish 1992 with a level of official 
reserves similar (in terms of imports) to that which pre-
vailed at end-1989; 2) between 1993 and 1995, the capital 
account improved sharply, reaching an average annual sur-
plus of 7.3% of GDP in CEEC 6 and leading to a rapid rise 
in official reserves. Third, inflows have increasingly been 
used to finance the build-up of reserves rather than current 
account deficits. The proportion of the total net capital in-
flow received by CEEC 6 that was used to finance the cur-
rent account deficit declined from about 60% in 1993 to 
only an estimated 26 % in the first half of 1995. 
Using statistical information from the IMF World Econ-
omic Outlook data base for the period 1987-93, Calvo, 
Sahay and Vegh (1995) also conclude that the CEEC 6 as a 
whole began receiving in 1993 a net capital inflow which, 
as a percentage of GDP, was very high for international 
standards. The orders of magnitude of the total net capital 
inflow (including net errors and omissions) estimated by 
these authors for 1992 and 1993 (US$ 1.6 bn and US$ 12.2 
bn, respectively) are similar to those obtained in this report. 
In contrast to the figures displayed in table 9, however, 
their study suggests that the capital account of CEEC 6 re-
corded a substantial deficit in both 1990 (US$-4. 7 bn) and 
1991 (US$ -8 bn). 
This divergence between the results reached by these 
authors and those presented in this paper seems to be most-
ly due to the data on foreign exchange reserves used for the 
early years of the transition. Unlike the figures shown in 
table 3, the data in Calvo, Sahay and Vegh (1995) indicate 
that reserves continued to fall in 1991 and, although at a 
much slower pace, in 1992. This weaker behaviour of re-
serves might, in turn, be explained by the inclusion in the 
reserves statistics used by these authors for 1989-91 of the 
entire reserves held by the mono-bank systems before they 
were broken up. Between 1989 and 1992, most CEEC in-
troduced two-tier banking systems separating central bank 
and commercial bank functions. The decline in reserves 
shown by Calvo, Sahay and Vegh might therefore reflect in 
part the allocation by the authorities of a portion of the in-
ternational reserves of the previous mono-banks to the 
newly-created commercial banks. This is not the case for 
the reserves data used in this report, which show only the 
part of the reserves of the mono-banks attributable to the 
central bank. 
VII. Private versus official capital inflows 
An important feature of the sharp increase in capital in-
flows experienced by CEEC I O as a group since 1993 is 
that it is fully explained by the expansion of private in-
flows. This implies that the proportion of official inflows 
in total capital inflows has fallen considerably between the 
periods 1990-92 and 1993-95, although the data currently 
available still do not allow this decline to be quantified 
with precision. 
Table 10 shows, for the CEEC 10 as a whole and for the 
period 1990-94, gross disbursements of macro-financial 
assistance and project loans, as well as commitments of 
technical cooperation grants, by the major multilateral and 
bilateral donors. It indicates that, after rising very strongly 
and reaching a peak in 1991, the sum of these official in-
flows practically halved during the period 1992-93 and re-
covered only moderately in 1994. A similar profile is ob-
tained if the change in arrears 12 on official debt and the 
reschedulings and debt forgiveness approved by the Paris 
Club are added to the official loan disbursements and grant 
commitments. The support obtained through the accu-
mulation of arrears on official debt and in the form of Paris 
Club debt relief is referred to in table I Oas "official excep-
tional financing" and has been very substantial during the 
transition period in the cases of Bulgaria and Poland. 
The sum of the gross official assistance inflows shown in 
table 10 (including official exceptional financing) declined 
in the CEEC 6 from a peak of US$ 14. 8 bn in 1991 to an 
average of US$ 5.3 bn in 1993-94. During the same period, 
and as shown in table 9, total net capital inflows into these 
six countries increased from US$ 6.4 bn to an average of 
US$ 13 bn. Although the information on official assistance 
presented in table 10 is not exhaustive, it is therefore diffi-
cult to escape the conclusion that the post-1992 surge in 
capital inflows to CEEC 10 is largely of a private nature 
(see graph 4). 
Table 10 also seems to confirm the idea, advanced in the 
previous section, that official disbursements and the provi-
sion of both official and private exceptional financing were 
the main factors accounting for the fact that, despite initial 
capital flight, the interruption of international bank lending 
and the need to make substantial foreign debt repayments, 
the capital account of CEEC 6 was in balance in 1990 and 
recorded a significant surplus in 1991-92. In particular, 
without disbursements and exceptional financing from 
official sources, the aggregate capital account of CEEC 6 
would have recorded an average annual deficit of US$ 6.3 bn 
in 1990-92, instead of the US$ 3.6 bn average surplus it 
actually showed. By contrast, even when official inflows 
12 Arrears on both interest and principal payments. 
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TABLE I O : Relative weight of official flows in total capital flows into CEEC 10 
(in million of US dollars) 
Gross IMF disbursements 
Grosss World Bank disbursements (IBRD + IDA) 
Gross disbursements by EBRD 
Gross disbursements by EIB 
EU/G-24 balance of payments support (gross dish.) OJ 
of which: 
EU(2l 
Other G-14 
Technical cooperation grants from the EU/G-24 (3) 
(/) Total above 
(II) Official exceptional financing (4) 
( 1/1) Total ( I) + ( II) 
(IV) of which: received by CEEC 6 
(V) Total net capital inflows into CEEC 6 
of which: 
Net FDI inflows 
International capital markets (gross) (5) 
Total net inflows into CEEC 6 - disbursements and 
special finance from official sources to CEEC 6 
(V)-(IV) 
Memorandum items: 
Net disbursements from the !MF 
Total (official and private) exceptional financing (4) 
<I l Excluding exceptional financing. 
12 J Excluding bilateral contributions by EU member states. 
nl On a commitment basis. 
- - -
1990 
658 
328 
0 
0 
957 
446 
511 
416 
2359 
5592 
7951 
7772 
100 
610 
1331 
-7672 
328 
8738 
14
< Excluding Slovenia. Includes debt deferrals or reschedulings, debt forgiveness and changes in arrears. 
1991 1992 
3716 1332 
1014 1097 
0 160 
35 154 
1866 1182 
861 915 
1005 267 
1230 2028 
7861 5952 
6976 1491 
14837 7443 
14800 7125 
6400 4200 
2278 2953 
2094 2118 
-8400 -2925 
3640 809 
10900 3042 
(S > Includes !!ross issues of international bonds and equity, and new medium- and long-term syndicated bank loan commitments. 
Sources: European Commission, !MF, World Bank, EBRD, EIB, and tables 7, 8 and 9. 
GRAPH 4 : The declining role of official inflows to CEEC 6 
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1991 1992 1993 
1993 
530 
1066 
357 
180 
444 
357 
87 
1691 
4268 
1734 
6002 
5234 
13900 
3757 
6402 
8666 
230 
2710 
(l) Gross disbursements from the !MF, the World Bank, the EBRD and the EIB; gross disbursements of macro-financial assistance and commitments of technical 
cooperation grants from the EU/G-24; and official exceptional financing. 
Source: European Commission, !MF, World Bank, EBRD, EIB and table 9. 
1994 
1851 
1540 
666 
210 
148 
88 
60 
1064 
5479 
335 
5814 
5404 
11700 
3071 
4720 
6296 
-36 
1489 
1994 
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are excluded, the aggregate capital account of CEEC 6 still 
shows a very substantial surplus in the period 1993-94 
(amounting to an average of US$ 7.5 bn per annum). 
A more complete picture of the evolution of official flows 
and of their relative role in total net capital inflows should 
show official inflows on a net basis (that is, after deducting 
amortizations). It should also include net official export 
credits, net credits granted by private creditors but guaran-
teed by foreign official donors (in particular, bank credits 
covered by a guarantee of an official export credit agency), 
and bilateral grants not classified under technical cooper-
ation. All these official flows have been left out of table 10 
for lack of reliable or sufficiently long time series. How-
ever, the incorporation of these additional elements into the 
analysis is unlikely to modify the bottom line. 
Given that most of the loans granted by the international fi-
nancial institutions and the EU/G-24 Network to CEEC I 0 
were disbursed from 1990 onwards and have relatively 
long maturities, the difference between the profile of gross 
and net official disbursements for such loans is still small. 
This difference is, if anything, likely to have increased 
since 1993, as the first repayment obligations associated 
with the 1990-92 loans fall due. Consequently, looking at 
net instead of gross inflows may in fact reinforce the argu-
ment of a declining share of official finance in total net 
capital inflows since 1993. Since purchases under IMF 
stand-by arrangements normally have to be repaid about 
three years after they are made, JMF assistance fits particu-
larly well into this story. As shown in table 10, the trajec-
tories described by net and gross IMF disbursements to 
CEEC l O are very much alike until 1993: a sharp increase 
and a peak in 1991 , followed by a marked decline in 1992 
and 1993. Then, in 1994, gross JMF disbursements recov-
ered substantially but net disbursements became negative 
reflecting a marked increase in repurchases (including the 
repayment ahead of schedule by the Czech Republic of its 
entire outstanding debts to the IMF, amounting to US$ 1.1 
bn) 13 . 
As for net official export credits, private credits with 
foreign public guarantees and grants not classified under 
technical cooperation, they may have risen since 1993. But 
they would need to have increased unrealistically sharply 
to alter in any significant way the conclusion that the 
post-1992 surge in capital inflows experienced by CEEC 
has been driven by the expansion of private inflows. 
VIII. Prospects for the capital account 
Future trends in the capital accounts of CEEC will largely 
depend on the economic policies implemented by the auth-
orities. Provided government policies aim at ensuring con-
tinued progress in the areas of macroeconomic stability and 
13 The Czech Republic is not the only CEEC I Oto have decided in 
recent times to repay IMF loans ahead of schedule in reponse to 
strong capital inflows and rapidly rising official reserves. In 1995, 
Poland repaid ahead of schedule all its outstanding debts to the 
IMF (about US$ 1.2 bn) and Hungary made early repayments on 
about US$ 600 mn of IMF debt maturing before end-1998. 
structural transformation, the trend towards an increasingly 
dominant role for private flows in total capital flows should 
not be reversed in the coming years. 
Disbursements of investment-project loans from official 
development banks (particularly those from the EBRD and 
the EIB) are likely to pick up significantly, reflecting com-
mitments already made, strengthened lending facilities in 
some cases 14, and a gradually improving absorption capac-
ity by the recipient countries. However, this will probably 
be more than offset by the expected increase in repayments 
on past balance of payments and project loans, the decline 
in new disbursements of macro-financial assistance (in 
line with the improved external position and market access 
of most CEEC 10), and a reduction in official exceptional 
financing following the implementation of the 1994 D DSR 
agreements in Bulgaria and Poland. At the same time, pri-
vate capital should continue flowing into CEEC l O in sub-
stantial amounts in the coming years, although the record 
levels currently seen in some countries are unlikely to be 
sustained for very long. Private capital should be attracted 
by favourable growth prospects, a more stable macroeco-
nomic and political outlook, progress with systemic re-
form, the removal of restrictions on capital flows and the 
development of the domestic securities markets. 
The major risks to this scenario stem from the slow prog-
ress being made by some CEEC in the main fields of struc-
tural transformation (privatization and enterprise restruc-
turing; financial sector reform; tax, civil service and social 
security reforms), from the still vulnerable macroeconomic 
position of several countries, and, somewhat paradoxi-
cally, from the excessive strength of the capital inflows 
being received by several countries. 
Structural deficiencies can not only prevent some countries 
from sustaining high rates of growth without causing infla-
tion and current account problems but can also directly hin-
der the expansion of private capital inflows. A hesitant im-
plementation of privatization and other structural policies, 
for example, can act as a deterrent for FDI. Underdevel-
oped domestic financial markets, for their part, tend to re-
strict portfolio inflows. 
Regarding the still fragile macroeconomic situation of 
some countries, the favourable scenario assumes that the 
Hungarian authorities continue to adopt adjustment 
measures conducive to a reduction in the country's current 
account deficit. A serious risk to this scenario, therefore, is 
that a failure of the authorities to pursue such stabilization 
policies results in renewed balance of payment difficulties 
in Hungary. Also, the experience of Romania in 1995, 
where an unwarranted easing of financial policies has re-
sulted in a weakening of the balance of payments after the 
substantial progress made in 1994, warns about how ephe-
14 The EIB ·s capacity to lend to CEEC has been substantially rein-
forced by the decision taken by the EU Council in December 1993 to 
grant to the Bank guarantees to lend to these countries up to ECU 3 
bn over the years 1994-96. The countries covered by the decision 
are Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland. Roma-
nia, Slovakia and the Baltic states. 
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meral the improvement in market access can be when it is 
not supported by a continued implementation of sound ma-
croeconomic policies. 
Finally, another risk is that those countries that are current-
ly benefiting most from the surge in private capital inflows 
(and in particular the Czech Republic) fail to take the 
necessary accompanying measures to limit their negative 
macroeconomic repercussions and the danger of a sudden, 
Mexican-style reversal of the inflows in the future l 5. 
15 Schadler, Carkovic, Bennett and Kahn (1993) discuss possible 
policy options for dealing with capital inflow surges. 
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Community (EUR-15) 
Principal economic policy measures - December 1995 
Ireland (IRL) 
15116.12 The Madrid December European Council approves the joint re-
port submitted by the Council (Ecofin and Labour and Social Affairs) 
and the Commission on the implementation of the European Union's ap-
proach in the employment field. 
15/ 16.12 The Madrid December European Council adopts the scenario 
for the changeover to the single currency and confirms that I January 
1999 will be the starting date for Stage 3 of Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
Belgium (B) 
14.12 The central bank reduces its discount rate from 3.50% to 3%. At 
the same time, it brings its central rate down from 3.95% to 3.75%, its 
rate on advances within the ceiling from 6% to 5% and its rate on ad-
vances outside the ceiling from 8% to 7%. 
14.12 A consortium made up of Ameritech, Tele Denmark and Telecom 
Singapore offers to pay BFR 73.3 billion for a 49.9% stake in Belgacom. 
Denmark (DK) 
14.12 The discount rate is lowered by 50 basis points to 4.25%. The repo 
rate is lowered by 25 basis points to 4.75%. 
28./2 The Danish National bank lowers its repo rate by 15 basis points to 
4.60%. 
Germany (D) 
14.12 The Bundesbank cuts its discount and Lombard rates by 50 basis 
points to 3.0% and 5.0% respectively. In addition, the next three repur-
chase agreements will be offered at a rate of 3.75%. The central bank 
also announces that its M3 money-supply growth target for 1996 will be 
in the range of 4%-7% (as against 4%-6% for l 995). 
16.12 The Bundesrat approves the Federal budget for 1996. 
Greece (GR) 
30. 1 I The Government announces its incomes policy for 1996, which 
provides for nominal wage increases in the public sector equal to 2.5% 
on I January l 996 and 2.5% on l July 1996. 
J 8.12 The Bank of Greece announces a cut in its discount and Lombard 
rates by half a percentage point to 18% and 21.5% respectively. 
Spain (E) 
15.12 The Bank of Spain cuts its daily intervention rate by 25 basis 
points from 9.30% to 9.05%. 
2R. 12 The Government approves a package of fiscal measures to supple-
ment the rolling-over of the 1995 budget into 1996. 
30.12 Registration tax on small cars is reduced from 12% to 7%. 
France (F) 
7.12 The Bank of France cuts its intervention rate, which sets the floor on 
market rates, from 4.80% to 4.70%. The five-to-ten-day lending rate, 
which sets the money market ceiling, remains unchanged at 6.10%. 
15.12 The Bank of France announces that it is cutting its intervention 
rate to 4.45% from 4.70% with effect from 18 December. 
19.12 The National Assembly formally adopts the Finance Law for 
l 996, which cuts the central-government deficit to FF 287 .8 billion 
(3.6% of GDP) in 1996 from FF 321.8 billion (4.2% of GDP) in 1995. 
21.12 The Bank of France cuts its five-to-ten-day lending rate from 
6.10% to 5.85%. 
27.12 Following the "social summit" on 21 December 1995, the Gov-
ernment adopts measures intended to sustain consumption. These in-
clude a relaxation of conditions on the use of savings for home owner-
ship and the possibility for employees to take money out of company 
saving schemes early. 
14.12 The central bank reduces its key lending rate ("short-term facil-
ity") from 7% to 6.5%. 
Italy (I) 
22.12 The Italian Parliament approves the Budget Law for 1996. The 
Budget Law - and other related financial legislation - aims to reduce 
general-government net borrowing from an estimated 7.4% of GDP in 
1995 to 5.9% of GDP in 1996. To achieve this. a LIT 32.5 trillion 
budgetary package is introduced, almost equally distributed between 
revenue- and expenditure-side measures. A small part of the package 
(LIT 5.3 trillion) is specified at a later date (29 December). Revenue-
side measures are centred on four items: (i) the fight against tax evasion. 
(ii) the extension to 1996 of capital tax on enterprises, (iii) the extension 
to 1996 of the settlement of tax disputes, and (iv) a rise in excise duties. 
On the expenditure side, around half of the projected savings should 
come from the reduction of transfers to the local administration and to 
private enterprises and institutions, a quarter from the effects of the pen-
sion reform and the remainder from the rationalisation of public-admin-
istration and health-care expenditure. 
Luxembourg (L) 
None. 
Austria (A) 
1.12 The Austrian National Bank reduces the GOMEX rate (for open-
market transactions) from 4.05% to 3.95%. The discount and the Lom-
bard rates remain unchanged at 3.5% and 5.25% respectively. 
14.12 In line with the German Bundesbank, the Austrian National Bank 
reduces the discount rate from 3.5% to 3.0%. The Lombard rate and the 
GOMEX rate stay at their previous levels of 5.25% and 3.95% respect-
ively. 
18.12 The Austrian National Bank reduces the GOMEX rate from 3.95% 
to 3.75%. 
Netherlands (NL) 
12.12 The Senate, following the Lower Chamber, approves a draft law 
concerning an energy tax. Intended to encourage small consumers 
(households and small firms) to save energy, this law will enter into force 
on 1 January 1996. Revenues from this tax will be redistributed to 
taxpayers via various tax allowances. 
14.12 The Nederlandsche Bank reduces its rate on special advances 
from 3.60% to 3.40% and cuts its central rate from 3.25% to 2.75%. 
Portugal (P) 
19.12 The Banco de Portugal cuts its main money market intervention 
rates by 50 basis points. The rate for draining liquidity is lowered to 
7.75% and the rate for injecting liquidity (overnight standing facility) to 
10.5%. 
Finland (FIN) 
10.12 The Bank of Finland cuts its tender rate from 4.75o/c to 4.25%. 
Sweden (S) 
None. 
United Kingdom (UK) 
13.12 The Chancellor of the Exchequer cuts the base rate by \/4% to 
6\/2%. 
5. I 2 The House of Commons approves the budget. 
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